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ABSTRACT
Several years ago, the mobile and audio-visual industry was betting on Digital Video 
Broadcasting – Handheld (DVB-H) and mobile television as the newest growth 
opportunity. But today, commercial deployments are scarce and end-user adoption is 
below expectations. This article focuses on developments within the Italian market, 
known as the best developed market for mobile television services in Europe. Making 
a case study analysis, the article aims to provide an in-depth overview of the Italian 
mobile television market, and a better insight into the business model design issues 
mobile service providers face with regard to mobile television. Such an understanding 
of the pioneering Italian mobile market makes it possible to identify the key factors 
of the initial success and eventual failure of DVB-H services, setting perspectives for 
future mobile television services and industries all over the world.
INTRODUCTION
Originally, mobile television raised high hopes of major growth for both 
the telecommunications and media industries all over the world, but these 
expectations have not been met for different reasons. Undeniably, still now 
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the development perspectives of mobile television industries are fundamen-
tal. First, for the digital dividend policy, which is at the top of the European 
governments agenda, and second, because of technological developments 
that are driving the uptake of mobile Internet and video.
In this article, specific focus will be placed on the business model of mobile 
broadcasting services in Italy. Whereas operators in most European countries 
were reluctant to invest in building a Digital Video Broadcasting – Handheld 
(DVB-H) network to convince customers to buy DVB-H-enabled handsets, 
Italy became known as the main developed mobile television deployment in 
Europe. However, market growth proved considerably lower than expected. 
In addition, the main Italian mobile operator, Telecom Italia Mobile (TIM), 
decided to stop its DVB-H offer in late 2010. The aim of the article is to give 
an in-depth analysis of the Italian mobile television market and provide a 
better understanding of several business model design issues mobile service 
providers face with regard to mobile television. Such a thorough understand-
ing of the pioneering Italian market should make it possible to identify the 
key factors of initial success and eventual failure of DVB-H services, setting 
perspectives for future mobile television services. The most significant insight 
provided by the following analysis of Italy is that DVB-H is regarded as 
less promising than third-generation (3G) and 4G mobile telecommunica-
tions technology as a way of providing future mobile television services.
Assessing this future may not only have far-reaching implications for the 
mobile industry, but may have relevance for policy-makers as well. Now that 
analogue terrestrial television has been switched off in (most countries in) 
Europe, the question as to how to benefit from this released spectrum is at 
stake. The allocation of these frequencies allows for the creation of new distri-
bution networks, such as digital terrestrial television (DTT), and the support 
of innovative wireless services, including mobile television and mobile broad-
band. As mobile television has failed to deliver added value, it can be ques-
tioned whether allocating additional spectrum to mobile television eventually 
leads to the creation of public and private value, and whether this spectrum 
should be allocated to providing ‘real’ value-added services (Evens et al. 2010). 
In their analysis of the digital dividend in Austria, Börnsen et al. (2011) have 
shown that mobile broadband would generate considerably higher economic 
value than digital television services.
RISE AND FALL OF MOBILE TELEVISION
Since the mid-1990s, advances in digital equipment and network technology 
have encouraged a rapid growth in the individual consumption and personal 
experience of multimedia content. These developments not only enable view-
ers to personalize preferred content they want to watch, thanks to interactive 
services (anytime) and the multitude of advanced user terminals (anyhow), 
viewers can adapt their viewing behaviour to their preferences. As part of 
this trend towards more personalized media consumption, and alongside 
the growth of the mobile telecommunications sector, ‘the place of viewing is 
no longer limited to the television receiver at home, but is widened to allow 
personalised viewing of television by individuals wherever they are located’ 
(DigiTAG 2005: 5). Thus, mobile broadcasting offers the opportunity to watch 
regular television and interactive programming directly on one’s mobile hand-
set while being ‘on the move’ – in public transport, waiting for an appointment 
or at work. This idea of watching television on the move is anything but new. 
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As Trefzger (2005) has illustrated, Sony introduced its first portable television, 
the Watchman, in 1982, but unlike with its music peer the Sony Walkman 
consumer adoption remained low. There were several reasons for the failure 
of the Watchman, e.g. its dimensions (nearly 20 cm high and 9 cm wide), 
its screen (tiny) and its battery power (too low) (Günthör 2005). However, 
technological innovations now offer digital image quality and the possibil-
ity of reception on a consumer device that provides people with ubiquitous 
and permanent connectivity: the mobile phone (Castells 2006). Consumers 
are increasingly using these advanced phones for information and entertain-
ment purposes, such as watching video clips, listening to music, browsing the 
Internet, posting social media status updates, etc. As mobile devices and tele-
vision are strongly rooted within people’s daily lives, a bright future has been 
predicted for mobile broadcasting since the beginning of the century. Being a 
prime example of the enduring convergence spiral, mobile television has been 
widely discussed in analyst reports, trade magazines and academic papers, 
and has typically generated overenthusiasm and unrealistic expectations.
Equipment manufacturers and especially mobile service operators had several 
incentives to invest in the deployment of mobile television services since they have 
to cope with saturating markets. In most parts of the world, mobile subscription 
rates are close to or even over 100 per cent penetration (Andersson 2005). Faced 
with falling average revenue per user (ARPU) due to intensified competition, the 
entrance of low-usage consumers, and regulatory interventions regarding roam-
ing fees and termination tariffs, the European mobile industry saw opportuni-
ties for additional revenues and began to roll out a dedicated DVB-H network 
infrastructure. The creation of a new kind of ‘mobile multimedia’ would enable 
mobile network operators to increase the ARPU by opening up the market 
potential of media industries. On the other hand, traditional business models 
of these media industries, and the audio-visual industry in particular, became 
highly challenged by audience fragmentation induced by the proliferation of new 
digital channels and the omnipresence of distribution platforms (e.g. cable oper-
ators and IPTV, but also online video aggregators YouTube, Hulu, etc.). For the 
television industry, mobile television would mean a new distribution platform 
for its content (Urban 2007) and for connecting with new and existing audi-
ences (Södergård 2003). Despite these supply-side expectations, however, there 
was little enthusiasm on the demand side. In addition, the industry identified 
(yet unrealized) business opportunities for adding revenue, but willingness to 
pay among consumers proved rather disappointing since added value of mobile 
television was far from obvious. These diverging expectations and interests of the 
supply and demand sides regarding the product in the value chain eventually led 
to a questionable business model (Jarvenpaa and Loebbecke 2009).
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
The resource-based view of the firm (see Wernerfelt 1984; Dierickx and 
Cool 1989; Barney 1991) and the institutional theory serve as the theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the mobile television market in Italy. As argued by 
Pagani et al. (2005), exclusive resources are considered the main source of sustain-
able competitive advantage for a given firm. Collins and Montgomery (1998) 
distinguish between material and immaterial resources and organizational 
capabilities. Whereas material resources are tangible and easily identifiable, 
immaterial resources include reputation, brands, corporate culture and busi-
ness intelligence. Organizational capabilities mainly refer to a firm’s ability to 
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efficiently combine these resources in planning and implementing its value-
creating strategy. Whereas these resources should ideally be neither perfectly 
imitable nor substitutable without great effort in order to reinforce a strategic 
position in the market, competitors are often able to counter the firm’s value-
creating strategy with a substitute (Barney 1986). Institutional theory deals 
with these instances of imitation and differentiation amongst organizations 
competing in the same market. As in the mobile television industry, telecom-
munication operators mostly enter into exclusive partnerships with content 
suppliers, and this rationale applies to this emerging market. Furthermore, 
as suggested by Powell and Di Maggio (1983), successful organizations are 
regarded as the sector benchmark, which other organizations are likely to 
imitate. Within telecommunication markets, the ARPU serves as the main 
indicator of market performance. Hence, product and pricing strategies as well 
as business models of incumbent operators are often imitated by challengers 
illustrating, the importance of long-term innovation in the sector.
Although the emergence of digital technology has broadened the broad-
casting ecosystem, the success of new end-user applications such as mobile 
television services will depend on multiple factors, which go far beyond 
the technological issues. As Braet and Ballon (2008) argue, the main design 
choices for framing mobile television business models to be addressed are not 
predominantly technological in nature, but rather related to the cross-impact 
of strategic cooperation and competition issues, market expectations, and 
legacy situations. In this perspective, business model design issues were almost 
completely overlooked while launching mobile television services as a result 
of a technology-narrowed perspective. Although technology was the driver 
for these new innovative services, its business model seemed severely under-
developed and the establishment of a sustainable mobile ecosystem failed. 
The growing body of literature on business model design (e.g. Ballon 2007; 
Bouwman et al. 2008) defines four interrelated design domains of business 
models for mobile services, i.e. service, technology, organization and financial.
The Italian mobile television market (both 3G and DVB-H) is examined 
as a particular case of the mobile industry while focusing on the abovemen-
tioned aspects of the business model design: market structure and cooperation 
models (organization), industry revenues and subscription rates (financial), 
content supply and pricing (service) and transmission technologies (tech-
nology). Because some of these issues are closely intertwined, they will be 
discussed in various sections throughout the text. The goal of this case study 
is to understand the dynamics in the Italian mobile television market and 
examine the strategies and business models deployed by the present players 
regarding the DVB-H technology. This business model analysis should help 
to rethink the future of DVB-H in particular and mobile television services in 
general. The case study is based on a multi-method research approach that 
includes six face-to-face interviews with representatives from all main service 
operators, and document analysis of corporate publications (annual reports, 
press releases, etc.) and publicly available information (press coverage).
CASE STUDY: ITALY
General telecom market overview
In terms of the penetration of mobile services, Italy is considered the most 
developed country in Europe. According to the OECD (2011), Italy has 
the highest penetration rate of cellular mobile devices in the world. With a 
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penetration rate of 146.1 per cent (91.4 million subscriptions in a total popu-
lation of roughly 59 million people), Italy is one of the leading countries – 
compared to a global average of 102.6 mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants. 
About 85 per cent of all mobile subscriptions are pre-paid, which mainly 
explains the extraordinary growth of mobile services in the Italian market. 
Although pre-paid cards have benefits both for operators (reducing consumer 
acquisition and billing costs, targeting new consumer segments, etc.) and 
consumers (better cost control, lower switching costs, etc.), this flexible type of 
service does not guarantee a stable source of income and allows the entrance 
of low-usage consumers (Gruber 2005). Hence, it is no surprise that Italy has 
one of the lowest mobile ARPUs in the world ( 16.2 compared to a global 
average of 24.3), which is decreasing year by year.
Mobile revenues account for nearly 17.6 billion, constituting over half of 
total telecommunications revenues in the Italian market, one of the highest 
percentages in Europe. This proportion may indicate the strategic importance 
of the mobile sector in the overall Italian telecommunications market, and 
helps explain the mobile industry’s focus on further growth opportunities by 
means of launching innovative end-user services. Although regulation towards 
lower end-user tariffs led to a 4.4% decrease in mobile revenues in 2009, the 
mobile industry is still the most important revenue-generating and profitable 
branch of telecommunications in Italy (AGCom 2010). Simultaneously, the 
market for 3G services is growing rapidly in Italy, in contrast to many other 
European countries, where the transition to 3G services is taking longer than 
originally planned and has taken off only in recent years. Whereas already 
24.6 million Italians (or 43%, considerably higher than the global average 
of 18%) had already purchased a Web-ready mobile terminal in 2007, pene-
tration grew to 57% with more than 33 million advanced end-user terminals 
(mainly smartphones) in the market in 2009 (OECD 2011). The number of 
unique users regularly consuming mobile Internet is more than ten million. 
Total revenues for mobile Internet among all operators are estimated at 
around 400 million (Politecnico di Milano 2010).
As in other European telecommunications markets, one public opera-
tor (all state-owned telecom activities were concentrated in Telecom Italia) 
was granted a monopoly until the liberalization in the mid-1990s. In 1993, all 
mobile-related telecommunications operations were transferred to its subsidi-
ary TIM. A second mobile operator was announced in 1990 and licenced 
in 1994. The contest was won by Omnitel (today Vodafone Italy), whose entry 
triggered off a very rapid growth in terms of subscribers. Additional compe-
tition arrived with the entrance of Wind and Blu (the latter failed in 2002). 
In 2000, five Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) licences 
for 3G mobile telecommunications services were auctioned by the Italian 
government. Incumbent 2G operators TIM, Omnitel and Wind were granted 
a licence, as well as new market entrants H3G and Ipse. The first commer-
cial 3G launch was undertaken by H3G subsidiary ‘3 Italia’ during 2003. 
Adoption of 3G services was slower than expected due to limited availability 
of 3G-enabled handsets. In addition, incumbent 2G firms were not keen on 
promoting 3G services after they had invested in upgrading 2G networks to 
deliver advanced services (such as multimedia messaging) and wanted to gain 
back these investments. Only the new entrant H3G showed a real interest in 
advancing 3G adoption (Gruber 2005).
Today, the structure of the Italian mobile telecom market has evolved to an 
oligopoly with two leading players and two challengers (see Table 1). Thanks 
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to competition in the market, the pioneering company TIM has lost its domi-
nant position, but is still the leading player with 40.4% market share, followed 
by Vodafone Italy (35.7%), Wind (16.9%) and H3G (7.1%). It is expected that 
especially Wind and H3G will gain market shares in the coming years at the 
expense of the former monopolist TIM. Simultaneously, the mobile industry is 
suffering from market saturation while mobile revenues have been declining 
in recent years. Due to increasing competition, market concentration has been 
gradually declining since the liberalization of the sector and the introduction 
of 3G licences (HHI concentration index of 8042 in 1996 to 3242 in 2009).
Mobile television market structure
Italy has been a pioneer in deploying mobile television services in Europe. 
3 Italia (an H3G subsidiary) was the first in Europe to launch a commercial 
DVB-H service during the soccer World Cup in Germany in 2006 (UMTS 
already in 2005). In addition, TIM and Vodafone came up with a DVB-H supply 
several months later. Today, three operators offer mobile television services 
using UMTS (H3G, Vodafone and TIM) and DVB-H (H3G and Vodafone). In 
late 2010, TIM announced that it would stop its DVB-H offer. The market for 
mobile television services (both 3G and DVB-H) rapidly expanded after its 
launch, but the market soon saturated and subscription figures began drop-
ping. Indeed, Table 2 shows that the number of subscribers has been growing 
for two years, and started to decline since 2007. At the launch of its service, 
3 Italia forecasted about seven million Italian users by 2011. To date, however, 
‘only’ some 600,000 Italians are subscribing to mobile television services (either 
paid or free). In 2007, a report by market analysis firm Juniper Research fore-
casted that the number of mobile TV subscribers in Western Europe would 
pass twenty million by 2011. However, the actual number of mobile television 
subscribers in Europe is estimated at 6.2 million, including 1.1 million to broad-
cast (DVB-H) and 5.1 million to unicast (UMTS) television services (EAO 2009). 
These figures suggest that consumer enthusiasm has remained below expec-
tations and that the forecast penetration and revenues for mobile television 
services were roughly overestimated in the past (Arthur D. Little 2009).
In Italy, no standard tender process for DVB-H licences was organized. 
At the beginning of 2006, mobile operator H3G acquired Canale 7, a DTT 
network operator and broadcaster, paying 220 million. This way, 3 Italia 
was able to implement a DVB-H network and launch a broadcast supply. 
A second DVB-H multiplex was acquired by Reti Televisive Italiane (RTI), part 
1996 2001 2006 2009
TIM (%) 89 52.3 42.8 40.4
Vodafone (%) 35.9 35.7
Wind (%) 13.6 16.9
H3G (%) 7.7 7.0
Blu-Wind-Omnitel (%) 11 47.7
Revenues (in  billion) 3.3 12.1 18.1 17.6
HHI-index 8042 4153 3365 3244
Table 1: Market shares and revenues for mobile telecommunications (AGCom 2010, 
own elaboration).
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of the Mediaset Group, through its acquisition of Europe TV. For competition 
reasons, Mediaset was prohibited to offer retail mobile TV services to end-
users and generate advertising revenues. The network would have to provide 
wholesale access to telecom operators, which could acquire spectrum under 
equal, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions. Additionally, the plat-
form would also transport third-party and non-affiliated content (Vesa 2009). 
Eventually, Vodafone and TIM agreed to use Mediaset’s multiplex for a period 
of five years with an option for a further five years.
Today, 3 Italia is the market leader for mobile television services in Italy. 
It has a roaming agreement with TIM allowing its customers to connect to 
2G services when they move out of 3G coverage (about 90 per cent of the 
Italian area). The company was the first to launch its ‘3TV’ service over DVB-H, 
and plays a key role as a vertically integrated operator that owns both the 
network and the content. By controlling the entire value chain, 3 Italia is 
able to manage the network infrastructure, select and package channels, 
and take care of the billing procedures. The mobile supply is composed of 
the in-house-produced La3 channels, in addition to satellite broadcaster Sky 
and public broadcaster RAI. It does not provide the popular Mediaset chan-
nels. TIM is the leading mobile operator and was the first to provide mobile 
television (‘Maxxi Mobile TV’, now rebranded ‘TIM TV’) based on the UMTS 
technology. The pay-TV supply is composed of streaming traditional broadcast 
channels (except for the public broadcaster RAI), video-on-demand and addi-
tional content. In 2010, TIM shut off its DVB-H-based television service by not 
renewing its five-year contract with Mediaset. The company argued that the 
DVB-H technology proved too weak for delivering a compelling user expe-
rience and decided to bet on the competing UMTS platform for launching 
mobile TV services. Finally, Vodafone Italy launched its service in 2006, making 
use of its own transmission infrastructure in conjunction with the DVB-H 
capacity provided by Mediaset. Similarly, to TIM, the company entered into 
a five-year contract with the multiplex operator. The company offers broad-
cast content mainly from Sky and Mediaset, and on-demand content (football, 
entertainment) via its ‘Vodafone Live!’ portal.
Service offerings
Following on from an overview of the Italian mobile television market struc-
ture, this section focuses on the operators’ mobile television service offerings. 
In literature, content bundling, together with pricing, is regarded as an essential 
component in the value proposition of mobile service platforms (Prario 2007). 
Therefore, the acquisition and packaging of content are major business model 
design issues to tackle (Evens et al. 2011). From several pilot projects and 
commercial mobile broadcasting deployments, it can be ascertained that the 
quality and the range of supplied content are highly critical for user acceptance. 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2007–2009 (%)
Unicast (UMTS) 32.57 92.14 85.62 58.28 38.48 −55
Broadcast (DVB-H) 0 369.61 888.82 734.92 557.75 −38
Total Italy 32.57 461.75 974.44 793.2 596.24 −39
Table 2: Mobile television subscriptions in Italy (in 1000s) (EAO 2009).
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The diffusion of mobile television services depends crucially on content availa-
bility and attractiveness (Schuurman et al. 2009). Whereas some experts believe 
that conventional broadcasting content should suffice, others argue that mobile-
specific content is a vital asset for creating value in the longer term. However, the 
development of content specifically designed for mobile consumption is expen-
sive, and may undermine the viability of the business model. Consequently, 
mobile service providers can gain a competitive advantage over other operators 
when establishing easy, direct and cheap access to (premium) content.
Table 3 summarizes the content offerings and prices of all three mobile 
television operators in the Italian market. Without discussing this overview in 
detail, it shows that all operators have opted for a pay-TV strategy instead of 
a free-to-air supply. Although the Italian competition authority ruled that TIM 
and Vodafone cannot be obliged to share advertising income with Mediaset, it 
seems that both chose a pay-for-content strategy (either flat fee or pay-per-
view). The benefit of this strategy is that it can be applied both to DVB-H and 
UMTS. This pay-TV strategy relates to the diverging interests between supply 
and demand. Whereas operators hope to generate extra revenues from mobile 
television, consumers regard it as a (free) complementary service on top of 
basic voice and data services. Although prices seem reasonable at first glance, 
pricing may be a major threshold for service adoption and may limit the serv-
ices’ penetration. Although this pay-TV supply may be attractive to a small 
innovative segment of the population, this strategy failed to convince a critical 
mass of consumers needed to create a sustainable revenue basis.
In terms of content, all operators provide three main types of video 
content: (1) traditional broadcasting channels in live streaming, (2) video-
on-demand (sports, news, music clips, etc.) and (3) mobile multimedia 
content (MMS, games, music, chat, etc.). Mobile television thus includes 
linear broadcasting streams as well as interactive services. Although mobile-
specific content was predicted as a success factor, only 3 Italia provides 
mobile-suited programming specifically developed for mobile viewing. This 
may be due to the high production costs related to this type of content (3 Italy 
uses in-house productions). When examining the channels offered, no opera-
tor combines the two most watched television channels in Italy (i.e. RAI Uno 
and Mediaset’s Canale 5) in the same package. 3 Italia has no agreement 
with Mediaset whereas Vodafone (and TIM) has no partnership with RAI (or 
La3). Thanks to the supply of La3, 3 Italia is able to provide most compelling 
market offer in terms of content supply – albeit the most expensive offer for 
the consumer. However, the analysis reveals that the content supply remains 
limited and does not provide the consumer with a wide array of broadcast-
ers. This lack of content – only nine channels are available with 3 Italia and 
Vodafone offerings – may be one important explanation for the slow market 
developments of mobile television in Italy.
Cooperation models
In addition to the above-mentioned value proposition, cooperation models may 
explain the performance of the three operators. As illustrated by Prario (2007), 
two different business models emerged in Italy: an operator-centric model and 
a wholesale model. As discussed, 3 Italia operates along the entire value chain 
(content provision partially outsourced). By acquiring national free-to-air 
channel Canale 7, it obtained a DVB-H frequency and is able to offer broad-
cast content directly to the consumer. The operator is pursuing agreements 
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Operator
Streaming VoD/PPV Others
Content Price Content Price Content Price
Channels of 
La3 (e.g. La3, 
La3 Cinema)
Sky channels 
(especially 
Sky TG24, Fox 
Mobile)
Channels of 
RAI
Concerti 3
3 Sport TV
Cartoon 
Network
Soap TV
Up 1.49 to 
2.29 per 
day
News
Entertainment
Concerts
Football 
matches
Concerts
Soap opera
Adult content
Quiz
2.99 for 
down-
loaded 
video 
(avaible for 
72 hours) 
1.49 for 
telefilm, 
cartoon 
portal
Backgrounds
Ringers
Games
Music
Traffic news
Ticket one 
Cinema
Chat
Access to 
the portal is 
free
The price of 
the ‘other 
content’ 
depends on 
its typology
Channels
Mediaset
Sky
Telecom 
Media Group 
(La7, MTV) 
1.5 per 
week, 
5 for 
unlimited 
access 
during 
30 days
Sky Mobile 
TV package 
available 
at 1.5 per 
week
The main offer 
is called ‘100 
per cent Video’ 
and includes 
horoscope, 
meteo, news
Goal of football 
matches (Serie 
A TIM)
Videoclips
Traffic news
(traffic cam)
Adult content
Cost per 
channel: 
1.5
1.50 for 
the goals
Backgrounds
Ringers
Games
Logo
2–4 for 
ringers
1–2 per 
logo
Channels
Sky
Mediaset
(Mediaset 
Fiction–
Mediaset 
Entertainment)
1.49 per 
week
Video goal 
of football 
matches (Serie 
A Vodafone)
News (TG5, 
TG1)
Cartoon
Fiction
Adult content
(Winter 
Olympics)
Backgrounds
Ringers
Games
ca. 500k 
songs
1–2 per 
ringer
2.5 per 
game
1.5 per 
logo
Table 3: Services and prices of mobile TV operators (own elaboration).
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with different broadcasters to create its bouquet of channels, complemented 
with its own La3 channels. 3 Italia’s business model is completely different 
from the one used by Vodafone and TIM until December 2010 (see Figure 1). 
As they do not own a DVB-H licence, both operators have an agreement with 
multiplex operator (and broadcaster) Mediaset, which manages the network 
operations and provides wholesale access to third parties. This way, Vodafone 
is able to exploit its brand as a distribution platform for third-party content 
and service providers by entering into long-term partnerships and developing 
business synergies (TIM previously applied the same strategy). In the literature 
(conditions for) such partnerships were found important for market success.
The consequences for both cooperation models may be obvious in terms 
of financial performance, but they have no major implications for consumers 
(since all service providers ‘own’ the customer). Its vertical integrated business 
model allows 3 Italia to control the entire value chain and to play a central 
role in the mobile television market. The company fulfils all business roles 
(content provision, packaging, transmission and access) and is able to create 
operational synergies, internalize content costs and capture all profit margins. 
Owning its own broadcast channels allows 3 Italia to acquire content at a rela-
tively low cost – although it has to make substantial investments in infrastruc-
ture establishment and maintenance – and allows the company to achieve 
operational excellence. This contrasts with the wholesale model deployed by 
TIM and Vodafone, which generates considerably lower profit margins due 
to higher costs for content affiliation (and DVB-H capacity). In 2009, TIM 
reported 149 million payments to television operators (particularly Mediaset 
and Sky Italia) to provide ‘TIM TV’, contributing to high fixed costs and 
lower profit margins. In this cooperation model, Mediaset owns the network 
capacity and acts as a gatekeeper for both operators that seek access to the 
consumer. According to the terms of the contract, TIM and Vodafone have 
been paying Mediaset 14 million per year to access spectrum. In most coun-
tries with DVB-H deployments, however, the mobile television value chain is 
based on an operator-centric model.
Figure 1: Mobile TV value chain (IDATE 2008).
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Technology design
Except for TIM, which abandoned DVB-H in 2010, Vodafone and 3 Italia opted 
for a mobile television service delivered via both the DVB-H and 3G network, 
whereas TIM abandoned DVB-H in 2010. Apart from 3 Italia (together with 
wholesale provider Mediaset), which also built its own dedicated DVB-H 
network, all mobile operators heavily invested in the further establishment of 
3G networks, as they saw revenue opportunities in delivering mobile data serv-
ices. Vodafone Italia, for example, has reported investments of around 9 billion 
in rolling out and optimizing UMTS network infrastructure since 2005. These 
investments may mainly explain TIM’s strategic move to abandon DVB-H. 
Given the considerable costs for content partnerships and network leasing, 
and given the poorly developed demand side and disappointing revenues, 
the decision should be understood from a return-on-investment perspective. 
Although TIM argued that its exit was technology-related due to the technical 
complexity of an end-to-end mobile broadcasting system, the difficulties with 
mobile television are predominantly financial. Taking into account the shrink-
ing consumer market for DVB-H services, the cost of accessing content and 
spectrum could no longer be justified. Therefore, TIM decided to prioritize an 
optimizing coverage of its own 3G network, which is more flexible to other 
services than the DVB-H technology and allows the carriage of multiple end-
user services. Increasingly, the company is faced with a continuing demand 
growth of mobile broadband and data services (+13.2 per cent revenues 
in 2009/2010) thanks to the expansion of the smartphone market. In contrast 
to dedicated DVB-H networks, 3G can be applied for multiple purposes and 
services including mobile television, mobile Internet, Internet telephony and 
mobile gaming. Following this rationale, it is expected that Vodafone is consid-
ering a similar move and is likely to close its DVB-H service after its five-year 
agreement with Mediaset has expired. This way, these mobile operators try to 
obtain more control over their network and services, and will be less depend-
ent on external capacity suppliers. Finally, this strategy could also be explained 
using cost control logic, as mobile telecommunications in Italy are faced with 
decreasing revenues and profits (party due to price regulations). TIM, for 
example, reported that 2010 revenues declined, with 10.5 per cent compared 
to 2009. This may also increase the need for more efficiency, cost-cutting and 
product rationalization with the incumbent operator.
DISCUSSION: FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
In the previous section, it was illustrated that the leading Italian mobile 
operator TIM abandoned DVB-H mainly for financial rather than technical 
reasons, and it was suggested that other operators (in case Vodafone) will 
allegedly imitate this exit strategy. The failure of DVB-H, however, should 
not automatically imply the demise of mobile television services in Italy and 
elsewhere. As Kivisaari et al. (2008) argue, service operators were focusing 
mainly on the technical aspects of the service, thereby neglecting various 
organizational and financial components of the mobile television business 
model. Conflicting interests between several stakeholders in the mobile 
ecosystem eventually resulted in an unsustainable business model. However, 
the coincidence of multiple technological developments may now provide 
new growth opportunities for mobile television and video usage.
First, telecommunication operators report an expanding demand for 
mobile Internet and especially an exponential growth in video content due 
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to the popularity of social networking sites and streaming video platforms. 
As a result, the proportion of video traffic in the overall mobile broadband 
traffic has increased to over 50 per cent and is expected to grow further in 
coming years (Levy 2010). According to the yearly Cisco Networking Index 
(Cisco 2011), global mobile data traffic will increase 26-fold between 2010 
and 2015, with video accounting for 62 per cent of global mobile IP traffic. 
Second, the advent of mobile IP-connected devices such as smartphones 
and tablet PCs is now moving the market to better consumer experience and 
more viable business models for mobile television services. These devices with 
improved back lighting, larger screen sizes and improved image quality allow 
for hyper-personalized media consumption and have contributed to increased 
viewing time and optimized viewing experience. The availability of applica-
tions will enhance this evolution towards mobile viewing. Third, these devices 
are equipped to stream content over 3G and especially Wi-Fi connections. 
From a technological perspective, Wi-Fi is more reliable than 3G, consumes 
less battery power and requires no additional subscription charges. Fourth, 
by prioritizing traffic and utilizing both cellular and wireless networks for 
mobile television, mobile carriers minimize network bottlenecks and reduce 
upgrade investments. Whereas previously the business model for mobile tele-
vision was uncertain due to conflicting interests between several stakeholders, 
chicken-and-egg problems for available content and handsets, and expensive 
costs related to the DVB-H infrastructure, these problems could be resolved in 
today’s ‘always-on’ mobile consumer market.
The increasing penetration of smartphones and tablet PCs, and the 
sound technology behind delivering video quality to mobile devices could 
open the way for a bright mobile TV future. From a user perspective, this 3G 
scenario may provide several benefits. Apart from the improved quality of 
experience, existing 3G-based mobile television services include a much 
wider array of channels. Whereas Italian consumers had access to only nine 
streaming DVB-H channels, the French mobile television packages supplied 
by Canal-Sat and Orange, which are exclusively delivered over 3G, include 
more than 60 channels. In addition, consumers are not obliged to buy an 
entirely new mobile device for accessing DVB-H channels, but can rely on 
their trusted 3G-enabled device to watch multimedia content. This belief is 
shared both by broadcasters and operators, who now enter a struggle for 
platform leadership (Curwen and Whalley 2008). Whereas the latter aim 
to preserve their powerful gatekeeper role, the former see opportunities in 
connecting directly with the consumer and building up a customer relation-
ship. Several broadcasters are now launching mobile phone and second-
screen applications allowing consumers to pull and interact with streamed 
video content. In an extreme case, broadcasters could set themselves as 
virtual mobile network operators (MVNOs) and retail mobile content 
directly to the consumer. Managing the customer relationship (owning the 
customer) allows broadcasters to exploit customer data and generate addi-
tional advertising revenues. Mobile carriers have similar strategies and are 
launching apps and portals that provide access to streaming content services 
preferably over 3G connections.
Because this growth in mobile data consumption is occurring faster than 
carriers can add capacity, this evolution may stretch the capabilities of exist-
ing network infrastructure and now encourages operators to heavily invest in 
network upgrades in order to ensure quality of the viewing experience. Telecom 
experts consider 3G cellular networks’ throughput and latency performance 
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inadequate for mobile television services, and expect that the deployment of 
4G/LTE (Long-Term Evolution) will enable a significant improved multime-
dia experience. However, current expenditures in upgrading 3G networks may 
hold back operators’ investments in future-proof 4G/LTE networks (Bohlin 
et al. 2007). From a policy perspective, the allocation and assignment of spec-
trum for LTE (and beyond) is an essential part of the digital dividend spec-
trum. In October 2011, Italian mobile operators acquired 4G radio frequencies, 
paying a total of 3.9 billion, and will start LTE trials in 2012. This may suggest 
that mobile operators consider the use of LTE for supplying amongst other 
mobile videos However, since network operators are forced to invest in network 
upgrades, they may be eager to pass the bill to those platforms that are driving 
this growth in data consumption. As this increased traffic comes from online 
platforms such as Google, Facebook and YouTube, this may trigger off disputes 
on cost sharing for network investments. This refers to the topical net neutrality 
policy, according to which telecommunication operators could charge service 
and content providers for delivering higher quality of experience and prioritiza-
tion of traffic. Should broadcasters be asked to pay transmission costs for their 
mobile supply, this could form an important threat to the business model of 
mobile television services and cease the renewed future of mobile television.
CONCLUSIONS
By means of a case study analysis, this article investigated the deployment of 
mobile television services in Italy. The goal was to understand the main opera-
tors’ strategies regarding DVB-H technology and mobile television supply. The 
Italian market has long been considered one of the most developed markets 
in the world, but market growth and service penetration remained below the 
expectations. Leading mobile operator TIM decided to abandon DVB-H in 
late 2010, pricking the mobile television ‘bubble’. In order to identify the keys 
to success and the causes of failure, several aspects of the business model 
(service, technology, organizational and financial design) were considered 
and analysed from a resource-based view of the firm. The analysis revealed 
that no single operator is able to provide a comprehensive supply of television 
channels that could compete with traditional offerings. The channel supply 
was rather limited, with either the popular Mediaset or RAI missing. Being 
the largest operator in the market, TIM had the most developed subscriber 
base and the most well-known brand, whereas H3G has two very important 
tangible assets, which gave it a strategic and competitive advantage. First, 
owning the DVB-H licence allows H3G to act as a central gatekeeper and 
to control the transmission of the mobile product. Second, the ownership of 
the La3 broadcasting group allows the operator to have relatively cheap and 
easy access to content and to internalize all profit margins. Combining the 
roles of network operator and content provider, 3 Italia functions as a verti-
cally integrated network operator so that the company can control the entire 
value chain and realize scale economies. This is completely different from the 
situation of TIM (and also Vodafone), which relies on the wholesale access 
provided by Mediaset to operate a mobile television service. Since TIM and 
Vodafone cannot internalize frequency leasing and content acquisition costs, 
both have higher operational costs and fewer incentives to stay in the under-
performing DVB-H market than H3G. Hence, it is expected that Vodafone 
will imitate TIM’s exit strategy and fully concentrate on 3G services. Thanks 
to the rapidly increasing penetration of smartphones and tablets, which are 
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driving the demand for mobile Internet, experts predict a renewed and even 
brighter future for mobile television services. Mobile video consumption may 
still represent a real consumer need and an expanding market. Although the 
technology design for mobile television (i.e. DVB-H) failed, most operators 
and broadcasters now bet on IP-based technology platforms (Wi-Fi, 3G and 
beyond) to deliver video quality to mobile end-consumers.
The analysis presented in this article only took into account the specific 
market circumstances of the Italian mobile television case. However, this anal-
ysis could be placed within a broader European and even global perspective as 
well. All over the world, except for Japan and South Korea, mobile broadcast 
services based on the DVB-H technology have struggled to develop a sustain-
able ecosystem and to build a substantial subscriber base. Hence, mobile 
operators have abandoned dedicated DVB-H networks and optimized multi-
purpose 3G networks that can meet the demand for mobile Internet, mobile 
video, mobile gaming, etc. This case study analysis could be relevant not only 
for scholars, but also for industrial stakeholders, which are keen to provide 
value-added services to their customers, and for policy-makers, who are eager 
to develop a cohesive vision on digital dividend issues to strengthen European 
competitiveness in the mobile industry. In this perspective, spectrum should 
not be safeguarded to DVB-H-based services, but can be assigned to mobile 
data applications through WiMAX, LTE and systems beyond.
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